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Abstract. The recent increase in the number of security attacks by cyber-
criminals on small businesses meant that security remained a concern for such 
organizations. In many such cases, detecting the attackers remained a challenge. 
A common tool to augment existing attack detection mechanisms within 
networks involves the use of honeypot systems. A fundamental feature of low-
interaction honeypots is to be able to lure intruders, but the effectiveness of 
such systems has nevertheless been affected by various constraints. To be able 
to secure honeypots systems, it is important to firstly determine its 
requirements, before taking appropriate actions to ensure that the identified 
requirements have been achieved. This paper critically examines how existing 
low-interaction honeypot systems abide to major requirements before 
recommending how their security could be improved. 
Keywords: Low-Interaction Honeypots, Deception in Depth (DID), 
Deceptiveness, Intelligence, Robustness. 
1   Introduction 
Even though the massive growth of the internet over the past years provided 
various benefits to end users and businesses, security remained a concern [1, 2]. It has 
recently been reported that there has been a huge rise in attacks as cyber-criminals 
have been targeting small businesses [3]. In many such attacks, detection of the 
attackers remained a challenge. Although security systems like intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), firewalls, intrusion prevention systems (IPS) have been existent since 
many years to enhance the security of networks; various issues were raised with 
regards to detection of new attacks [4]. A common tool to augment existing attack 
detection mechanisms within networks is honeypot and by using such systems, new 
attacks could be uncovered, assault patterns might be revealed, and the precise 
thought processes of the intruder could be studied [5].  
A key purpose of a honeypot is to serve as a decoy used to lure intruders in order to 
accumulate important information about the intruder and technique of attack that was 
used to compromise the system. The gathered information could then be used by the 
organization to trace back the attacker and to also improve its internal defense 
mechanisms. Honeypot systems can be developed for two reasons purposes, namely, 
production and research, and can either be of low-interaction or high-interaction [6]. 
Low-interaction honeypots simulate some portion of the operating system for instance 
the network stack, while focusing on services that cannot be utilized by the intruder to 
adventure the real system. This type of honeypot normally implements only the 
Internet protocols to permit interaction with intruder while making the latter believe 
the real system is being compromised [7]. On the other hand, high interaction 
honeypots are complete production similar systems that have a full set of services and 
permit an intruder a great deal of scope throughout the intrusion. Generally, high 
interaction honeypots are challenging to recognize and are costly to maintain [8]. The 
costs of high interaction honeypots is a barrier to their adoption by small businesses 
and also most firms do not need high-interaction honeypots that captures massive 
amounts of data [9]. 
A fundamental feature of low-interaction honeypots is to be able to lure intruders, 
but the effectiveness of such systems has nevertheless been affected by various 
constraints. In the past, attackers have been using OS fingerprint techniques such as 
NMAP, Xprove to remotely attack and distinguish honeypot from a real system [10]. 
Moreover, data security experts have been increasing focus on defensive strategies 
while neglecting offensive strategies [6] thereby increasing its vulnerability to 
intruders. If a honeypot is discovered by an intruder, its purpose is defeated and no 
advantage is provided to the organization adopting it. As such, improvement of 
existing honeypot systems is needed.  To be able to secure network systems in 
general, it is important to firstly determine its requirements, before taking appropriate 
actions to ensure that the identified requirements have been achieved [11].  
In terms of related work, although various studies focused on improving honeypot 
systems against newly identified vulnerabilities and attacks, limited published 
literature is available on the comparison related to how existing low-interaction 
honeypots adhere to their security requirements. As such, this paper critically 
examines how existing low-interaction honeypot systems abide to key identified 
requirements before recommending how their security could be improved. The 
analysis and recommendations provided in this paper could be used by researchers 
and experts in their endeavor to improve the security of low-interaction honeypot 
systems to eventually benefit businesses. The paper is structured in the following 
manner: In section 2, the security requirements of honeypots are investigated before 
reviewing the existing honeypot systems in section 3. Results from a comparative 
analysis is provided in section 4 followed by recommendations on how the security of 
low-interaction honeypots could be improved in section 5. Finally, the work is 
concluded in section 6. 
2   Key Requirements of Honeypots 
A major security requirement of honeypot systems is its deceptiveness [12, 13]. 
Deceptiveness involves obscuring valuable data in bland-looking files, and set up 
honeypots that divert attackers from the real assets whereby leading them to false 
intellectual property, or causing them to trip alarms [14, 15].  In short, deception 
involves misleading attacker into believing something that is false. Among the 
deceptive techniques, camouflage involves disguising the network infrastructure by 
making it a moving target, changing addresses, infrastructure topologies, and 
available resources daily. In other words, camouflaging take steps to prevent attackers 
from seeing the same infrastructure twice [16]. Disinformation is another process 
which involves diverting or confusing attackers with false information [15]. In this 
process as well the hacker is supplied with fake successes, responses, files, and assets 
to exploit. Also, disinformation poised that any false information given must not be 
easily disprovable. Moreover, work has also been done to categorize the 
sophistication of deceptive discipline into different levels, namely, static, dynamic 
and adaptive deception [17]. Static deception has been referred as constant execution 
of an often uncontrollable trait whereas dynamic deception is implemented upon 
activated response to some stimuli. Adaptive deception in turn adjusts and reacts to a 
situation while also and employing cognitive assessment before, during and after the 
fact. 
Another essential requirement of honeypots systems are their robustness and fault 
tolerance [7, 18]. A system is said to be fault-tolerant if it is able to automatically 
recover from errors or faults while also being able to eradicate faults without suffering 
from an externally perceivable failure [19]. This essential ability ensures that 
honeypots are able to recuperate while at the same time guarantees robustness as the 
system is able to also cope with errors during execution [7].  
Furthermore, intelligence of honeypot systems is also important. Intelligence 
enables honeypots to gain actionable insights by gathering threat intelligence feeds 
and adversary indicators that define and describe trends, tendencies, methods, and 
actions taken by attackers [20]. Intelligent honeypot pretend to surrender to one form 
of attack in order to suppress a second, less-obvious defense.  With series of attacks 
on different levels of relevance and context, intelligent honeypot continue to ramp up 
their threat intelligence capabilities while increasing their effectiveness with regards 
to intelligence-led deceptions.  
3   Low-Interaction Honeypot Systems 
Different low-interaction honeypot systems have been proposed and this section 
reviews the common ones. 
3.1  Honeyahole 
Principally designed and developed to escape from honeypot hunting, honeyahole 
implements three phases, namely, collection, redirection and deception in order to 
gather four types of attacking information to build up the blacklist [6]. The honeypot 
has two redirection techniques embedded to dynamically send incoming traffic to a 
production or a deception server in the same redirection phase. 
3.2  Honeywall 
Honeywall is a honeypot that helps in deploying honeynet with ease by automating 
the process of deployment [2]. This honeypot can also capture and analyze traffic 
(both inbound and outbound) of honeynet activity. An identified vulnerability of this 
honeypot involves construction of a traffic stream that consists of strings matching 
snort_inline's rewriting database before verifying whether all packets are received 
unmodified [21].  
3.3  Honeyd 
Honeyd is a low-interaction, open source honeypot, and can be deployed in various 
platforms (Windows, UNIX) [22]. It can emulate operating systems at TCP/IP stack 
level and also monitor all UDP and TCP based ports (as shown in Fig. 1). A few 
vulnerabilities of this type of honeypot were also found. Studies showed that Honeyd 
can be detected remotely using fingerprint attacks [23, 24] and using timing analysis 
of ICMP ECHO request [5]. In an attempt to improve the identified limitations, work 
has been done to create a new camouflaged Honeyd by modifying the original 
honeypot in addition to the underlying operating system support in order to permit 
high-fidelity emulation of events [25]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Honeyd infrastructure [25] 
3.4  Honeytrap 
Being a low-interaction honeypot that operates by observing attacks against 
network services, honeytrap aims at collecting malware in an automated manner [14]. 
It permits the collection of traffic information for pre-closed ports by opening them in 
which an access is observed. As a limitation, this honeypot is not able to capture 
details pertaining to the activities of an attacker unless a second attempt is made to the 
same honeypot [26].  
3.5  Nepenthes 
As a honeypot used for malware collection, Nepenthes inherits the scalability of 
low-interaction honeypots and its flexibility enables it to emulate vulnerabilities of 
different operating systems on a single machine during a single attack [27]. In terms 
of limitations, Nepenthes is only capable to collect autonomously propagating 
malware and that malicious software which spread using hitlist to find vulnerable 
systems are hard to detect [28]. Furthermore, since Nepenthes emulates huge number 
of vulnerabilities, it makes it easy to detect by attacker, because many TCP ports are 
open in the process [28]. 
4   Comparative Analysis 
Literature analysis reveals that the focus of the different reviewed low-interaction 
honeypots vary in terms of characteristics and abilities. For Honeyd, detection using 
OS fingerprinting attacks reduces its deceptiveness, camouflaging and robustness 
capabilities [23, 24], although it has the ability to emulate sensitive features of 
operating system and gather vital information of attacker as well, thus illustrating 
intelligence [24]. On the other hand, Honeywall depicts robustness and intelligence 
due to its ability to capture and analyze traffic (both inbound and out bound) of 
honeynet activity [20]. Moreover, this honeypot has also been portrayed as intelligent 
as it is able to deceive and link the attacker to the honeypot system [21]. Honeytrap, in 
turn, does not collect details of attacker on the first attempt the attack is made but 
rather relies on further attack attempts to be able to correctly detect the attacker which 
is a big disadvantage in terms of intelligence [26]. Honeyahole is basically designed 
to escape honeypot hunting with focus on camouflaging, deceptiveness and 
robustness [6]. Finally, although Nepenthes is portrayed as a highly deceptive 
honeypot, it has different vulnerabilities thus making it easy to detect by an attacker 
[28]. Moreover, due to its inability to detect malwares that propagates using a hitlist 
makes its intelligence and robustness undermined [28]. Comparisons are summarized 
in Table 1 to show how existing low-interaction honeypot systems have been 
portrayed by literature. 
 
Table 1.  Comparative Analysis  
Item Deceptiveness Robustness Intelligence 
Honeyd √ × √ 
Honeywall √ √ √ 
Honeytrap √ √ × 
Honeyanole √ √ × 
Nepenthes √ × × 
 
From Table 1, it could be seen that deceptiveness has been the major focus of the 
reviewed low-interaction honeypots towards misleading attackers. The five honeypots 
showed to have this capability although a few vulnerabilities have been highlighted 
especially relating to the use of Honeyd and Nepenthes. Robustness, which relates to 
coping with errors during execution, was identified as an important requirement of 
honeypots. However, literature showed that this requirement has not been a major 
focus of a few honeypots. Among the three requirements, intelligence seems to be the 
least focused aspect of low-interaction honeypots. Among the 5 honeypots that were 
compared, 3 of them did not portray intelligence abilities, which is important to better 
deceive attackers while also accurately obtaining their details.  
5   Recommendations 
Results showed that the key requirements needing attention are robustness and 
intelligence of low-interaction honeypot systems. Robustness can be improved using 
redundancy or collaborative honeypot systems such that in case one of them fails, 
others remain operational. Faults within existing honeypots could also be isolated by 
further testing such systems. On the other hand, different works have been conducted 
to improve the intelligence of low-interaction honeypots. First of all, honeypot 
systems can embed intelligence by learning the moves of attacker in addition to tools 
used to compromise systems [29]. Also, honeypots systems can be made dynamic 
whereby having the capability to learn about network environments and 
infrastructures before autonomously deploying individual honeypots based on current 
layout [20]. Furthermore, after deployment, such systems should be able to repeatedly 
monitor network changes and update configurations accordingly [20]. Additionally, 
the Deception-in-Depth (DiD) concept of operation could be utilized [30]. DiD 
utilizes the layering approach with three different layers in the proposed model aimed 
at strengthening the defense of honeypot systems [31]. Within the model, the 
honeypot asset is represented in the innermost layer whereas the honeypot is 
positioned in the middle layer of the model. The purpose of the outermost layer is to 
improve deception using techniques including fake access points. 
6   Conclusions  
This paper examined how existing low-interaction honeypot systems abide to their 
requirements before recommending how their security could be improved. Three 
important requirements of honeypot systems were identified namely deceptiveness, 
robustness and intelligence. Among these requirements, existing low-interaction 
honeypots seem to focus on deceptiveness with reduced attention given to their 
robustness and intelligence. As such, more work is needed towards improving 
robustness and intelligence of low-interaction honeypot systems so as to improve their 
overall effectiveness. As future work, the proposed recommendations could be 
practically evaluated to assess their effectiveness. Moreover, a framework could be 
proposed focusing on the three requirements investigated in this study to help 
businesses in their endeavor to prevent attackers from detecting, exploiting, and 
deceiving honeypot systems and assets.  
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